In this paper we prove a formal form of Chaitin's "heuristic principle", for an appropriate measure of complexity: "the theorems of a finitely specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself'". For this measure, the theorems of a consistent finitely specified theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic (like ZermeloFraenkel set theory with choice or Peano Arithmetic) have bounded complexity, hence every statement of the theory which is significantly more complex than the theory is unprovable. Previous results showing that incompleteness is not accidental, but ubiquitous are here reinforced in probabilistic terms: the probability that an n-bit statement is provable in such a theory tends to zero when n tends to infinity. 
Introduction
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem states that every finitely presented consistent theory which is strong enough to include arithmetic is either inconsistent, incomplete or both. Gödel's original proof as well as most subsequent proofs are based on the following idea: a theory which is consistent and strong enough can express statements about provability within the theory, statements which are not provable by the theory, but which through a proof by contradiction, turn out to be true. A true and unprovable statement is called independent. This type of proof of incompleteness does not answer the questions of whether independence is a widespread phenomenon nor which kinds of statements can be expected to be independent.
Chaitin [14] presented a complexity-theoretic proof of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem which shows that high complexity is a reason of the unprovability of infinitely many (true) statements. This result suggested the following "heuristic principle": the theorems of a finitely specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself. 1 This approach
Background
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, announced on 7 October 1930 in Königsberg at the First International Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics 2 is a landmark of the twentieth century mathematics (see [31, 33, 30] for the original paper, [42, 47, 10, 34] for other proofs and more related mathematical facts, [35, 37, 45, 27, 50, 28, 46, 5, 13, 34, 7] for more mathematical, historical and philosophical details). It says that in a consistent finitely specified theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic, there are true, but unprovable statements; so such a theory is incomplete. A true and unprovable statement is called independent.
According to Hintikka ( [34] , p. 4), with the exception of von Neumann, who immediately grasped Gödel's line of thought and its importance, the incomprehension of incompleteness was total at the conference in Königsberg. In spite of being praised, discussed, used or abused by many authors, the Incompleteness Theorem seems, even after so many years since its discovery, stranger than most mathematical theorems. 3 For example, according to Solovay ( [36] , p. 399): "The feeling was that Gödel's theorem was of interest only to logicians"; in Smoryński's words, ([36] , p. 399), "It is fashionable to deride Gödel's theorem as artificial, as dependent on a linguistic trick."
In 1974 Chaitin [14] presented a complexity-theoretic proof of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem which shows that high complexity is a reason of the unprovability of infinitely many (true) statements. This complexity-theoretic approach was discussed by Chaitin [16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23] and various authors including Davis [24] , Tymoczko [49] , Boolos and Jeffrey [3] , pp. 288-291, Svozil [48] , Li and Vitányi [39] , Barrow [1, 2] , Calude [4, 6] , Calude and Salomaa [11] , Casti [12] , Delahaye [25] ; it was critized by van Lambalgen [38] , Fallis [29] , Raatikainen [44] , Hintikka [34] .
Chaitin's proof in [14] is based on program-size complexity (Chaitin complexity) H: the complexity H(s) of a binary string s is the size, in bits, of the shortest program for a universal self-delimiting Turing machine to calculate s. It shows that for every consistent finitely specified theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic, there exists a positive constant M such that no statement of the form "H(x) > m" is provable in the theory unless m is less than M . As the complexity H(s) is unbounded, each true statement of the form "H(x) > m" with m > M (and, of course, there are infinitely many such statements) is unprovable in the theory.
The high H-complexity of the statements "H(x) > m" with m > M is a source of their unprovability. 4 Is every true statement s with H(s) > M unprovable by the theory? Unfortunately, the answer is negative because only finitely many statements s have complexity H(s) < M in contrast with the fact that the set of all theorems of the theory is infinite. For example, ZF C (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice) or Peano Arithmetic trivially prove all statements of the form "n + 1 = 1 + n". The H-complexity of the statements "n + 1 = 1 + n" grows unbounded with n. This fact, noticed and discussed by Chaitin in section 6 of [22] (reprinted in [21] pp. 55-81) and presented by Svozil [48] , pp. 122-125, is at the core of the critique in [29, 44] (cited in Hintikka [34] ); the works [22, 21, 48] seem to be unknown by these authors.
Chaitin's proof based on H cannot be extended to all unprovable statements, hence the problem of whether complexity is a source of incompleteness remained open. In this note we prove that a formal version of the "heuristic principle" proposed by Chaitin in [21] , p. 69, namely that "a set of axioms of complexity N cannot yield a theorem of complexity substantially greater than N " 5 is correct if we measure the complexity of a string by the difference between the program-size complexity and the length of the string, our δ-complexity (Theorem 5.1). The H-complexity of the statements "n + 1 = 1 + n" grows unbounded with n, but the "intuitive complexities" of the statements "n + 1 = 1 + n" remain bounded; this intuition is confirmed by δ-complexity. Note that a statement with a large δ-complexity has also a large H-complexity, but the converse is not true.
As a consequence of Theorem 5.1 we prove that the incompleteness phenomenon is more widespread than previously shown in [31, 30, 14, 20, 21] and by the topological analysis of [9] : the probability that an n-bit statement is provable in a consistent finitely specified theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic tends to zero when n tends to infinity.
Prerequisites
We follow the notation in [6] . By IN = {0, 1, 2, . . .} we denote the set of non-negative integers. The cardinality of the set A is denoted by card (A). Let us fix X = {0, 1}; by X * we denote the set of finite strings (words) on X, including the empty string λ. The length of the string w is denoted by |w|. We consider the following bijection between non-negative integers and strings on X: 0 → λ, 1 → 0, 2 → 1, 3 → 00, 4 → 01, 5 → 10, 6 → 11, . . . The image of n, denoted bin(n), is the binary representation of the number n + 1 without the leading 1. The length of bin(n) is almost equal to log 2 (n).
We assume that the reader has some familiarity with Turing machines processing binary strings, computability and program-size complexity (see, for example, [4, 3, 6, 26] ). The program set (domain) of the Turing machine T is the set P ROG T = {x ∈ X * : T (x) halts}; when T halts on x, T (x) is the result of the computation of T on x. A partial function ϕ from strings to strings is called partial computable (abbreviated p.c.) if there is a Turing machine T such that: a) P ROG T = dom (ϕ), and b) T (x) = ϕ(x), for each x ∈ P ROG T . A computable functions is a p.c. function ϕ with dom (ϕ) = X * . A set of strings is computable if its characteristic function is computable. A set of strings is computably enumerable (abbreviated c.e.) if it is the program set of a Turing machine. Every infinite c.e. set has an infinite computable subset. As usual, (W i ) is an effective enumeration of all c.e. sets.
A formula ϕ in the language of arithmetic is called ∆ 0 if ϕ contains only bounded quantifiers. A formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) in the language of arithmetic is called Σ 1 if ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) is of the form (∃x 1 . . . ∃x k )ψ, where ψ is a ∆ 0 formula. We write IN |= ϕ(n) to mean that ϕ(n) is true when n is interpreted as a non-negative integer. The Representation Theorem (see [47] ) states that a set R ⊂ IN is c.e. iff there (effectively) exists a Σ 1 formula ϕ(x) such that for all n ∈ IN:
A self-delimiting Turing machine is a Turing machine T such that its program set is a prefixfree set of strings. Recall that a prefix-free set of strings S is a set such that no string in S is a proper extension of any other string in S. In what follows the term machine will refer to either a p.c. function with prefix-free domain or a self-delimiting Turing machine.
Each prefix-free set S ⊂ X * satisfies Kraft's inequality:
where r i = card {x ∈ S : |x| = i}. In fact, a stronger result, the Kraft-Chaitin Theorem (see [6] , p. 53) holds true: Let n 1 , n 2 , . . . be a computable sequence of non-negative integers such that
Then, we can effectively construct a prefix-free sequence of strings w 1 , w 2 , . . . such that for
The program-size complexity of the string x ∈ X * (relative to T ) is H T (x) = min |y| : y ∈ X * , T (y) = x , where min ∅ = ∞. The Invariance Theorem states that we can effectively construct a machine U (called universal ) such that for every machine T there exists a constant
In what follows we will fix U and put H = H U .
Complexity-Theoretic Results
In this section we present our main results needed for proving our complexity-theoretic form of incompleteness, Theorem 5.1.
Recall that U is a fixed universal machine and H = H U . In what follows we will work with the function δ(x) = H(x) − |x| (note that −δ is a "deficiency of randomness" function in the sense of [6] , Definition 5.21, p. 113).
The
statements "1 + n = n + 1" have H-complexity of about log 2 n plus a constant, which tends to infinity with n; however, their δ-complexity is bounded.
In view of Theorem 5.4 in [6] , p. 102, there exists a constant c > 0 such that:
The following theorem is taken from [6] (Theorem 5.31, p. 117). As it will be important in what follows, we present all details.
Theorem 4.1 For every t ≥ 0, the set C t = {x ∈ X * : δ(x) > −t} is immune, that is, the set is infinite and contains no infinite c.e. subset.
Proof. Clearly, the set C t is infinite as, for each N , card {x ∈ X * : |x| = N, δ(x) > −t} > 2 N (1 − 2 −t ) ≥ 0. Next, assume that C t contains an infinite c.e. subset, hence it contains an infinite computable subset D. For x, y ∈ X * , we put x < y if bin −1 (x) < bin −1 (y), and define the machine T by T (0 i 1) = min{x ∈ D : |x| ≥ t + 2(i + 1)}. Clearly, T has a computable graph. Because T (0 i 1) ∈ D ⊂ C t , for each i ≥ 1, we have:
Consequently, by the Invariance Theorem, there exists a constant ε > 0 such that for infinitely many i, we have
Corollary 4.2 For every t ≥ 0, the set Complex t = {x ∈ X * : δ(x) > t} is immune.
Proof. As Complex t ⊂ C t and every infinite subset of an immune set is immune itself, we only need to show that Complex t is infinite. To this aim we use formula (2) and the fact that the function H(bin(N )) is unbounded. t Comment Let T be an infinite c.e. set of strings and t ≥ 0. Then, according to Corollary 4.2, there exists a non-negative N (which depends upon U, T, t) such that each string x ∈ T of length greater than N has δ(x) ≤ t.
Corollary 4.3
For every t ≥ 0, the set {x ∈ X * : δ(x) ≤ t} is infinite.
Proof. By Corrolary 4.2, the complement of the set {x ∈ X * : δ(x) ≤ t} is immune, so not c.e. t
Complexity and Incompleteness
In this section we analyze the role of complexity in incompleteness. Recall that U is a fixed universal machine. The following result proves a formal version of Chaitin's "heuristic principle": the theorems of an finitely specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself. Without restricting the generality, the theory will be expressed in terms of binary strings. Proof. Assume that T is complete for all true arithmetical formulas, that is, every true arithmetical formula is a theorem in T . For every a ∈ IN, the set {n ∈ IN : δ(bin(n)) ≤ a} is c.e., so in view of the Representation Theorem there exists a Σ 1 formula ϕ such that for every n ∈ IN we have: δ(bin(n)) ≤ a ⇔ IN |= ϕ(n). Consequently, the formula ψ = ¬ϕ represents the predicate "δ(bin(m)) > a". 6 Because of consistency and the hypothesis of completeness, by enumerating the theorems in T of the form ψ(m) (corresponding to all true formulas ψ(m)) we get an enumeration of the set {n ∈ IN : δ(bin(n)) > a}, hence the set {x ∈ T : δ(x) > a} = T ∩ {x ∈ X * : δ(x) > a} is c.e. Now let A be a non-negative integer. As {x ∈ T : δ(x) > A} is a subset of the immune set {x ∈ X * : δ(x) > A}, it has to be finite, that is, there exists an M ∈ IN such that for every x ∈ T such that δ(x) > A, we have |x| ≤ M . Finally put N = 1 + max{A, δ(x) : x ∈ T , |x| ≤ M }. Then, no theorem in T can have δ-complexity larger than N .
Because the theory is strong enough to formalize arithmetic, it contains infinitely many true statements x with δ(x) > N , each of which is not in T , i.e. is true but unprovable by the theory. t
Comments (a) In the above proof we may choose A to be zero or the δ-complexity of the theory T . Theorem 5.1 establishes a limit on the δ-complexity of provable statements; it is not clear whether this measure is suitable for measuring the complexity of the theory, i.e. trough the minimal N such that the theory proves no statement x with δ(x) > N (see also the discussion in [38] ).
(b) Assume that we have defined in some way the "set of true statements representable in the theory", a set which presumably includes all arithmetical true statements. Then, Theorem 5.1 shows that any "true statement" of δ-complexity higher than N is independent of the theory.
(c) The above theorem does not hold true for an arbitrary finitely specified theory.
(d) It is possible to have incomplete theories without high δ-complexity statements; for example, an incomplete theory for propositional tautologies.
We continue with two applications.
Incompleteness is Widespread
The first application complements the result of [9] stating that the set of unprovable statements is topologically large: We show that incompleteness is also widespread from a probabilistic point of view.
We begin with the following result:
Proof. We present here a direct proof. 7 For every n we have:
Consequently,
where r i = card {y : |y| = i, U (y) halts}. Using the Stolz-Cesaro Theorem we get
due to Kraft's inequality (4) and (5) we get (3). t Consider a consistent finitely specified theory and let T be its set of theorems. For every integer n ≥ 1, let T n = {x ∈ T : |x| = n}. By Theorem 5.1, there exists a positive integer N such that T ⊆ {x : δ(x) ≤ N }. Consequently, for every n:
We obtain: Theorem 6.2 Consider a consistent finitely specified theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic. The probability that a statement of length n is provable in the theory tends to zero when n tends to infinity.
Proof. Apply an appropriate binary coding of the statements of the theory and let T ⊂ X * be the set of theorems of the theory. Then, the probability that a statement of length n is provable in the theory is 2 −n ·card T n which, by (3), tends to zero when n tends to infinity. t Comment The binary codification used above has no influence on the validity of Theorem 6.2.
Incompleteness and Ω U
The second application is to prove Chaitin's incompleteness for Ω U [16] (see also the analysis in [25, 8, 6] 
Proof. To prove (6) we consider, for every k ≥ 1, the strings
where each w j is a string of length F (j) − F (j − 1) − 1, F (0) = 0, that is, all binary strings of length F (k) where we have fixed the bits at the positions F (1), . . . , F (k).
It is clear that
. . w k is bijective, hence to generate all strings of the form (7) we only need to generate all strings of length F (k) − k. Hence, we consider the enumeration of all strings of the form (7) for k = 1, 2, . . .. The lengths of these strings will form the sequence
which is computable and satisfies the inequality (1) as
Hence, by the Kraft-Chaitin Theorem, for every string w of length F (k) − k there effectively exists a string z w having the same length as w such that the set {z w : |w| = F (k) − k, k ≥ 1} is prefix-free. Indeed, from a string w of length F (k) − k we get a unique decomposition w = w 1 . . . w k , and z w as above, so we can define C(
So by the Invariance Theorem we get the inequality (6) . t
Consider now Chaitin's Omega Number, the halting probability of U : Ω U = 0.ω 1 ω 2 . . ., see [15] . The binary sequence ω 1 ω 2 . . . is (algorithmically) random. There are various ways to characterize randomness (see for example [18, 6, 26] ). A particular useful way is the following complexity-theoretic criterion due to Chaitin: there exists a positive constant µ such that for every n ≥ 1,
The condition (8) is equivalent to Σ ∞ n=0 2 −δ(ω 1 ω 2 ...ωn) < ∞, cf, [41] . It is easy to see that the inequality (6) in Lemma 7.1 contradicts (8), so a sequence x 1 x 2 . . . x n . . . satisfying the hypothesis of Lemma 7.1 cannot be random. Theorem 7.2 Consider a consistent finitely specified theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic. Then, we can effectively compute a constant N such that the theory cannot determine more than N scattered digits of Ω U = 0.ω 1 ω 2 . . .
Proof.
Assume by absurdity that the theory can determine infinitely many digits of Ω U = 0.ω 1 ω 2 . . . Then, we could effectively enumerate an infinite sequence of digits of Ω U , thus satisfying the hypothesis of Lemma 7.1 which would contradict the randomness of ω 1 ω 2 . . . t
Conclusions
We know various illuminating proofs of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem and many interesting examples of true but unprovable statements (see for example [21, 43, 32] ). Still, the phenomenon of incompleteness seems, even after almost 75 years since its discovery, strange and to a large extent irrelevant to 'mainstream mathematics', whatever this expression might mean. Something is missing from the picture. Of course, the 'grand examples' are missing; for example, no important open problem except Hilbert's tenth problem, see [40] , was proved to be unprovable. Other questions of interest include the source of randomness and how common the incompleteness phenomenon is. These two last questions have been investigated in this note.
Chaitin's complexity-theoretic proof of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem [14] shows that high complexity is a sufficient reason for the unprovability of infinitely many (true) statements. This approach suggested that excessive complexity might be a source of incompleteness, and, in fact, Chaitin (in [22, 21] ) stated this as a "heuristic principle": "the theorems of a finitely specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself". By changing the measure of complexity, from program-size H(x) to δ(x) = H(x) − |x|, we have proved (Theorem 5.1) that for any consistent finitely specified theory strong enough to formalize arithmetic (like Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice or Peano Arithmetic) we can compute a bound N such that no statement x with complexity δ(x) > N can be proved in the theory. For such a theory, the probability that an n-bit statement is provable tends to zero when n tends to infinity, so in a probabilistic sense most statements are unprovable. This result reinforces the analysis in [9] which shows that the set of unprovable statements is topogically large.
With reference to Theorem 5.1, does there exist independent statements x with δ(x) ≤ N ?
This question is open; however, in view of Theorem 6.2, the probability that a statement of length n with δ-complexity less or equal to N is independent tends to zero when n tends to infinity.
Related questions which are interesting to study include: a) the constructive nature of Theorem 5.1, b) the complexity of some concrete independent statements, like the statement expressing the consistency of the theory itself, c) the problem whether δ is an interesting measure of the complexity of a theory subject to Theorem 5.1.
